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1 Recently,  it  has  become  increasingly  common  to  question  the  extent  to  which
Santayana’s  philosophy  of  mind  can  and  should  be  identified  as  a  kind  of
epiphenomenalism, as has traditionally been the case. Most scholars take Santayana’s
epiphenomenalism for granted, and either assert or deny that he gives an argument to
support it.1 However, others have questioned whether the evident similarities between
Santayana’s  own  views  and  those  of  modern-day  epiphenomenalists  obscure  more
significant  differences.  I  will  argue  that,  indeed,  Santayana’s  views  are  potentially
inaccurately captured by the term “epiphenomenalism.” However, I shall argue that
this is true for reasons other than other scholars have given for this view. 
2 The issue turns on what Santayana means by a “cause” when he denies that ideas are
causes  of  action.  Here,  I  argue,  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  causes  and necessary
conditions. While Santayana is consistent in denying that ideas are causes, taken in the
usual  sense  of  efficient  or  motor  causes,  he  does  not  clearly  deny  that  they  are
necessary conditions for some behavioral effects. In this way, Santayana is able to deny
that  ideas  are  causes  in  any  standard  sense  of  the  term,  without  ruling  out  the
possibility that, in some cases at least, they are necessary conditions for action.
 
1. Challenges to the Epiphenomenalist Label
3 Efforts to label Santayana an epiphenomenalist are complicated by the fact that he does
not  share  with  modern-day  ephiphenomenalists  a  strong  predilection  for  either
determinism  or  reductionism.  As  has  been  pointed  out,  Santayana  is  not  a  strict
determinist because, at the level of matter, he allows for indeterminacy in the causal
chain.2 Nor, as has been pointed out, is he a typical reductionist because, at the level of
psyche,  Santayana  endows  living  organisms  with  their  own biological  ends,3 which
human beings pursue through a rational deliberative faculty, of whose operations they
remain largely unconscious.
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4 Yet  Santayana  also  seems  to  share  much  in  common  with  epiphenomenalists.
Epiphenomenalists  hold  that  mental  ideas  are  determined  by  physical  causes.
Although,  for  Santayana,  we  cannot  precisely  predict  which  intuited  essences  will
bubble up from material causes and appear to spirit – spirit is “volatile, evanescent,
non-measurable, and non-traceable” (Santayana 1942: 138) – he would still agree that
the probability that a given essence will appear under a given set of circumstances is
fixed by material causes. When we add to this Santayana’s claim that intuited essences
are not causes, then we appear to arrive at the standard epiphenomenalist position
that,  while  ideas  are  determined  by  physical  causes,  they  exert  no  causal  power
themselves:  intuition is present only in the form of an epiphenomenal shadow that
does no causal work. 
5 Yet it has seemed implausible to some that Santayana could completely banish mind
from his account of action given that the bulk of his work focuses on consciousness and
its objects, and on the ontological realms to which each correspond: spirit and essence,
respectively. However, of the two, scholars usually place far greater emphasis on spirit,
and eagerly search for a role for it. For example, in her 2015 book, Narrative Naturalism:
An  Alternative  Framework  for  Philosophy  of  Mind,  Jessica  Wahman  argues  against
epiphenomenalism on two grounds: (1.) “spirit is not a product or phenomenal effect of
matter,” i.e. the effect of a mechanical operation, and (2.) it is not “wholly passive or
helpless” (Wahman 2015: 167, 105). By her first claim, Wahman means to stress that
spirit  cannot  be  reduced to  matter  because  Santayana  would  not  describe  it  as  an
“effect”  of  matter  (that  is,  in  the  sense  in  which  that  term  is  usually  taken  by
scientists). With her second claim, Wahman attributes to spirit the ability to focus on
its objects. Thus, consciousness is not a mere “byproduct” because, she says, “the term
byproduct fails to capture the full extent of its place and role” (ibid.: 105).
6 Other scholars, such as Michael Brodrick, have argued that, while Santayana’s ontology
predisposed  him  to  epiphenomenalism,  and  while  there  are  certainty
epiphenomentalist strains in Santayana’s thought, his philosophy could also be placed –
perhaps  with more profit  –  under  another  position in  contemporary philosophy of
mind that gives greater prominence to spirit. In this manner, Santayana could adopt a
position that avoids the starkness of the distinction between matter and spirit, makes
them two sides of  the same coin,  and assigns spirit  a  role  co-equal  with matter.  If
Santayana  rejected  this  position  in  favor  of  epiphenomenalism,  then  Brodrick
conjectures that, ironically, it was his emphasis on spirit and his desire to maintain its
autonomy that led him in this direction (Brodrick 2013: 241-2). However, in focusing on
Santayana’s  conception  of  spirit,  and  arguing  for  a  stronger  role  for  it,  these
interpretations arguably miss the mark.
7 Although agreeing with these scholars in principle, we must argue that there is nothing
about  Santayana’s  conception  of  spirit  that  seems  to  contradict  epihenomenalism,
rather than support it. Contra Wahman, Santayana is always clear that spirit does not
have the power to chose its objects; even when consciousness points its attention in a
certain  direction,  it  is  pushed  in  this  direction  by  the  biological  interests  of  the
material  organism  seeking  to  satisfy  its  biological  drives.4 So  causal  power  is  not
properly  assigned to  consciousness,  or  spirit.  For  spirit’s  “supposed effects  are  the
effects of its causes” (Santayana 1942: 635). Instead, I would suggest that if we want to
understand  where  Santayana’s  thought  differs  from  epiphenomenalism,  we  must
examine, not consciousness, but the objects of consciousness. For it is these objects of
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consciousness – intuited essences – that,  in a sense,  both are and are not causes on
Santayana’s account – or so I will argue. 
8 My solution bears some similarity to Brodrick’s in arguing that Santayana’s thought
could  be  placed  under  another  category  in  contemporary  philosophy of  mind,  and
Santayana might have placed it there himself, had he been aware that an alternative to
epiphenomenalism was available to him.5 Unlike Brodrick however, I think that if we
more closely examine the role assigned to intuited essences in Santayana’s philosophy,
then we will discover that the contemporary philosophers with whom he has most in
common are precisely those who would find no contradiction between the so-called
“epiphenomenalist” strains in his thought and his tendency to assign ideas a limited,
but not insignificant role in guiding action. 
 
2. Essence and Existence
9 Let us first begin by examining how Santayana develops his position, so that we can
better  see  in  what  this  so-called  “epiphenomenalism”  consists.  As  the  title  of
Santayana’s Scepticism and Animal Faith suggests, the view that he begins to put forward
in  this  book  must  be  understood  as  arising  from  his  skepticism concerning  the
possibility  of  asserting  an  equivalence  between  a  set  of  oppositions,  which  can  be
elaborated as follows:
Essence Existing Thing 
Subjective Qualities Objective Qualities
Stable Properties
Abstracted From Spatial-Temporal Relations
Contingent Relations
In Spatial and Temporal Relations
Sign of What is Sought or Desired What is Sought or Desired
Perceptible Object Towards Which Impulse Appears
to be Directed
Material  Object  Eliciting  and  Receiving
Motor Response 
10 It is important to begin with this set of distinctions. Often, the suggestion is made that
Santayana has dogmatically defined the terms of the debate – be it spirit, psyche,6 or
matter7 – to suit his own purposes. It is then supposed by scholars as various as Lachs,
Kerr-Lawson, and Brodrick that his epiphenomenalism flows from these distinctions.
However, the key distinction for Santayana, with respect to his philosophy of mind, is
that between essence and existence. For the greater part of his career, Santayana had
been  preparing  the  way  for  this  distinction  between  essences  and  existence  by
examining the way in which the objects of consciousness – variously termed “ideas,”
“ideals,” or “intuitions,” depending on the stage of his career – are formed. Santayana
then carries forward these early insights into a rigorous distinction between essence
and existence.
11 For the early Santayana, an important feature of ideas is that they are composite in
their  make-up.  From  the  beginning,  he  describes  ideas  as  unique  constellations  of
sensory  data  from  a  variety  of  inputs,  such  that  a  single  object  of  consciousness
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emerges from a number of underling physical causes (Santayana 2011: 66-7).  As his
thought develops, Santayana seems to increasingly view the process by which objects
are brought to conscious awareness as taking place through the selective emphasis on
certain qualities of the object which are brought to the fore, while others recede into
the background. Before Scepticism and Animal Faith then, Santayana had already argued
that ideas are constructed in a particular manner, so that they include certain features
and exclude others. Later, in Scepticism and Animal Faith, Santayana argues that this not
simply as accident of human psychology, but is inherent in the nature of essence itself.
The result is that, insofar as we intuit an essence, it captures certain features of the
object  and  not  others.  Among  the  features  of  the  object  captured  by  the  essence,
Santayana mentions, in particular, the following:
1.)  The  subjective  and  secondary  qualities  of  an  object.  In Scepticism  and  Animal  Faith , 
Santayana argues that, in constructing an ideal, we focus on the qualities of the object
that  are  experienced  subjectively,  such  as  “the  quality  of  being  hot  or  poisonous”
(Santayana 1955: 88). Santayana thus argues that essences and “the intuition of them is
just as personal as my pain, pleasure or hunger” (ibid.: 86). Because the same water can
be hot to me and cold to you, the mind “has no capacity and no obligation to copy the
world of matter or survey it impartially” (ibid.: 98). 
2.)  The  apparently  stable  and  consistent  properties  of  the  object.  From  very  early  on,
Santayana argues that, through the process of idea-formation, we focus on the qualities
of an object that appear to be stable.8 In Scepticism and Animal Faith, he continues to
argue that this necessarily means excluding the contingent ways in which the object
effects, or is effected by, other objects (ibid.: 34). The idea will not therefore accurately
reflect or contain reference to the causal relation between its object and other objects.
Hence Santayana’s early claim now reappears in the form of the insight that essence as
such contains no necessary reference to the relationship in which an object stands to
other things as cause or effect – except perhaps insofar as their essences are included
in each other (as for example the essence of a caterpillar is included in the essence of
butterfly).9 Since  the  essence  is  eternal,  it  tells  us  nothing  about  the  cause-effect
relationships in which an object may or may not be contingently situated. 
3.) The qualities that can be abstracted from spatio-temporal relations. Due to the above, the
Santayana of Scepticism and Animal Faith stresses that essences exclude spatio-temporal
relations. Because essences contain reference to other essences, the contemplation of
an actualized essence can lead me to contemplate its relation to other, un-actualized
essences. But then I am contemplating the essential relations between essences, which
of  course  have  no  direct  equivalents  in  the  causal  domain;  I  am  contemplating
possibilities that may never be actualized in the causal domain. In this way, the way in
which one essence stands in a relationship to another in the realm of essence is like a
work of  literary  fiction,  in  that  it  is  more  or  less  internally  coherent,  but  without
connection  to  the  real  world,  or  any claim  to  “exist”  in  any  meaningful  sense
(Santayana 1955: 99). In general then, an essence in and of itself “tells me nothing of its
validity, nor of a world of fact to which it might apply” (ibid.: 91). 
12 In Scepticism and Animal Faith then, essence is eventually stripped of all the features that
it could share in common with existing things until essences have only limited bearing
on  the  realm  of  existence,  including  the  realm  in  which  action  is  carried  out.10
Santayana’s  philosophy  of  mind  flows  from  this  distinction  between  essence  and
existence. We are not the first to argue that the key to Santayana’s position lies in his
distinction between essence and existence, of course. This has been said before.11
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13 However, this distinction has sometimes contributed to a tendency to mischaracterize
Santayana’s  position  as  standardly  epiphenomenalist.  For  instance,  the  conclusion
Santayana is usually supposed to draw from the above distinction is that essence by
definition excludes existence, and therefore, essences, being unable to exist,  are also
deprived of causal power.12 This fact has usually been supposed to contain the only
premises Santayana needs to demonstrate his “epiphenomenalist” conclusion. Taken
on its own, it has led scholars to conclude that the intuition of essence plays no role in
determining behavior.  However,  we must not stop here,  or we might presume, like
many scholars, that Santayana has no further – or stronger – argument for his position,
and that this, his final word on the subject precludes any more complicated role for
essence. In fact, the claim that essence excludes existence is only one premise in the
longer argument he provides for his position in his mature work.13 We examine that
argument below. 
 
3. The Argument of Scepticism and Animal Faith
14 Let us now lay out the argument in which Santayana’s so-called “epiphenomenalism”
consists as it appears in Scepticism and Animal Faith. The claim that leads Santayana to
his views on mental causation is not only the claim that, “Not existing at all, [essences]
cannot be the causes of their own appearance,” but also, and more specifically, the claim
that essences cannot be the causes of their own hypostatization (Santayana 1955: 86).
15 Here,  Santayana  states  that  were  an  intuited  essence  to  play  a  role  in  action,  its
existence would first have to be posited, or as Santayana sometimes says, hypostatized.
(We leave aside of course the many forms of action that Santayana says can be carried
out unconsciously.) This is to say, it must be believed in. For example, an essence can
only be pursued insofar  as  it  is  taken to be the essence of  an  existing  object,  as  the
“hungry dog must believe that the bone before him is a substance, not an essence”
(ibid.: 233). Here, we are already see how important essences appear to be in action: the
positing  of  an  essence  is  the  first  stage  in  belief,  and  belief  is  the  first  stage  in
consciously directed action (Santayana 1942: 200-1). Here is where animal faith enters.
It is by means of animal faith that we posit the existence of an essence, and in this
capacity, intuited essences provide animal faith with its objects: “intuitions come to
help it out and give it something to posit.” (Santayana 1942: 107).14 This is important
because, for Santayana, the primary phenomenon we are trying to explain when we
attempt to explain human behavior is the hypostatizing of an essence through animal
faith. 
16 This point must be emphasized because animal faith has usually been given short shrift
in accounts of Santayana’s philosophy of mind, as scholars have generally puzzled by
the role of animal faith in Santayana’s ontology more generally.15 However, we can now
see that animal faith is not only the “glue” by means of which two ontological realms
are  bound together  –  for  in  positing  the  existence  of  an  intuited  essence  through
animal faith, we attempt to “close the gap” between the realm of essence and the realm
of existence – it is the phenomenon for which Santayana seeks an explanation.
17 Santayana then illustrates the importance of essences in action by way of the example
of a child who reaches out for the moon. Here the moon represents essence. In order to
reach out for the moon, the child must first posit the existence of the moon by positing
its existence as a graspable object in time and space.16 However, the very positing of an
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essence seems to require the identification of an object of thought – an essence – with
an object in the domain of existence. This can be said to occur in three senses, all of
which expose the reasons it is problematic:
1. First, the essence must be identified with a spatial-temporal object “capable of being
affected by action” (Santayana 1955: 214). But, as we have said, the essence is not the
exact equivalent of any temporally and spatially located object upon which the subject
could act “in the field of action” (ibid.). For an essence is never characterized by the
same relations as the object with which we would attempt to equate it.  We cannot
equate an essence with an existing thing without attributing to the essence relations
beyond those it itself already possesses (ibid.: 35, 56, 58).17 
2. Second, the very positing of the essence seems to require the identification of the
object of thought with an object that is capable of arousing and satisfying the subject’s
animalistic desires: “What is given becomes in this manner a sign for what is sought…”
(Ibid.:  85).  But essence appears at  most only as a fallible sign of  the object that the
human animals’ impulses truly desire and which they are seeking to attain.
3. Finally, there are “existing things to which the animal is reacting and to which he is
attributing  essences  as  they  arise”  (ibid.:  93).  The  child’s  impulses  are  for  example
called out  by some materially  existing cause,  which lead him to reach towards the
moon. The child then attempts to retrospectively identify the moon (the essence) with
the thing that  elicited this  motor  response  (the  existence).  By  positing  the  moon’s
existence he “determines what particular thing, in the same space and time as with the
child’s body, was the object of that particular passion” (ibid.: 173).
18 In positing the existence of the essence we are asserting, first, that the essence can be
identified  with  an  object  embedded  in  special-temporal  relations;  second,  that  the
essence is identical with the object of desire; and third, that the essence is the essence
of the thing that calls forth a motor response. Let us summarize all three points thus:
positing the existence of an essence involves the positing of an always false equivalency between
an object of thought (an essence) and a material cause of action (an existence). 
19 We can now see why Santayana believes that, insofar as essence plays a role in action at
all,  it  must  be  posited.  The  next  question  is,  “What  is  the  cause of  this  act  of
hypostatization?” In  answer,  Santayana  now  argues  that  the  essence  provides  no
motive  or  compulsion  for  its  hypostatization.  Hence  when  he  attributes  to  human
beings  a  “hypostatizing  impulse,”  he  insists  that  the  hypostatizing  “can  have  no
justification and no reason” (1915: 167). Santayana writes: “I have absolute assurance of
nothing  save  the  character  of  some  essence,”  and  “the  rest  is  arbitrary  belief  or
interpretation added by my animal impulse” (1955: 110; italics mine). “If I hypostatize an
essence into a fact, instinctively placing it in relations which are not given within it, I
am putting my trust in animal faith.” (Ibid.: 99; italics mine). 
20 To the casual observer, Santayana’s conclusion might seem strange. With respect to the
act of hypostatization, why does Santayana not locate its cause in the essence? Why, in
other words, does he not assign the essence causal power? The reason is very simple. In
doing  so,  Santayana  would  be  making  the  same  assumption  that  he  criticized  his
predecessors  for  making:  he  would  be  assuming  that  the  essence  posited  and  that
which causes it  to be posited are the same thing.18 For,  to assume that the essence
causes itself to be hypostatized would already be to identify the essence with a causally
efficacious  object  in  the  spatio-temporal  domain (i.e.  something capable  of  moving
animal impulses, or triggering a response from them). In order to avoid making any
Santayana’s Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-2 | 2020
6
such unfounded assumption, Santayana must refrain from asserting the identity of the object
of thought with the cause of action. 
21 Ironically, to make this assumption would, in effect, be to presume the very identity of
essence and existence which is  in question,  and which must – for that reason – be
posited in the act of hypostatization. This is the core of Santayana’s mature argument. Of
course, he will give us additional reasons to doubt that essences exert causal power. For
example, as he early on states in Reason in Common Sense, and maintains throughout his
career, the intuited essence often appears to us as a foretaste or premonition of the
object toward which animal impulses are already groping. It becomes an image or sign
of  an object the animal  is  already pursuing.19 Hence we can infer  that  it  would be
extremely unlikely if the intuited essence were able to turn around and exert power
over  those  impulses  of  which  it  was  itself  a  causal  product.  But  Santayana’s  main
argument in his mature work is that identifying essence with the cause of its positing
requires making a much greater assumption than his skeptical philosophy can tolerate.
All his skepticism will tolerate is the claim that, insofar as this hypostatizing impulse
has a source, it must lie in some object within the causal domain. The only conclusion it
allows  one  to  draw  is  that  the  ultimate  cause  of  the  positing  must  be  something
residing within the causal domain, with which the essence cannot be directly identified or
treated as substitutable.
22 This is why we must resign ourselves to the conclusion that the ultimate cause of our
action lies in something besides the essence itself. The reason for this conclusion is,
simply put, that we cannot conclude otherwise, except by assuming that the object of
thought just is the cause of action – a conclusion for which we have no basis. The idea
therefore is not what causes us to act. 
23 As we shall state it, Santayana’s argument for his so-called “epiphenomenalism,” is as
follows: 
(1) An essence would have to be hypostatized by a power external to itself before it
could play a role in human action.
(2) The power that hypostatizes an essence may be moved by a cause external to itself.
(3) However, whatever causes it to hypostatize the essence cannot itself be equivalent
to the essence in question. 
24 To summarize: The first claim entails that, since ideas are, at most, signs of existing
things,  they do not lend themselves to being hypostatized,  much less automatically
hypostatize themselves. For this, another power is required, which has the capacity to
hypostatize them: animal faith. Santayana next attempts to establish that, while animal
faith is itself moved by a cause external to itself, this cause is not, and cannot itself be
equivalent to the idea hypostatized. We have no basis on which to assert, and indeed
every reason to deny that the causal agent is equivalent to the essence. So the cause of
the hypostatization must be something other than the hypostatized idea. In sum, the idea
is neither the cause of its own appearance, nor of its own hypostatization.
 
4. Assessing Santayana’s Epiphenomenalism 
25 This, it can be argued, is what Santayana’s doctrine of “epiphenomenalism” amounts
to. I would now like to argue that this position does not rule out possible a role for
essence. My argument here shall be very simple: The hallmark of epiphenomenalism is
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that it denies that ideas figure as necessary conditions in an account of action. Thus, if
there  is  any  possible  sense  in  which Santayana allows  that  ideas  are necessary  for
action,  then he cannot be an epiphenomenalist.  But he does seem to allow for this.
Therefore, he is not an epiphenomenalist.
26 I  should  stress  that  in  asserting  this  I  am  not  denying  that  ideas  are  causally
inefficacious, or assigning them the status of motor or efficient causes. Nor, for that
matter,  am  I  denying  that  essences  cannot,  under  any  circumstances,  constitute  a
distinct chain of causes that intervenes in the chain of material causes. I am rather
claiming  that,  without  denying  any  of  this,  a  range  of  positions  are  available  to
Santayana, all of which would make the appearance of essence a necessary condition
for action: 
(1) Action must necessarily pass through the stage of intuition.
(2) Insofar as action must pass through the stage of intuition, intuition must necessarily
take an essence as its object.
(3) Material causes must themselves either act towards, or upon, an intuited essence,
for example in positing the existence of an essence.
27 All these positions would potentially allow Santayana to assert that, although intuitions
are not “causes” in the proper sense, they are “necessary conditions.” The first claim is the
weakest and requires the fewest theoretical commitments. The second and third are
similar to one another and require stronger theoretical commitments. 
28 The first and least contentious position compares intuition to the tip of a wave which
must crest before it breaks into action. The general picture Santayana gives us is one in
which  there  is  a  chain  of  causality  that  passes  from  external  causes  to  internal
intuitions: “The continuity of these motions, outside of man, in through his senses, out
through his impulses into his actions and influence is perfectly obvious. His senses and
impulses will not be aroused without arousing his spirit…”20 Here, Santayana does not
explicitly  say  whether  it  is  necessary for  the  process  to  pass  through  the  stage  of
intuition in order for action to reach completion. 
29 The question of whether the essence must appear or not may not, in fact, appear to him
to  be  an  easily  answerable  question.  If  the  question  is  whether  the  essence  is  a
necessary cause of action, Santayana would have to answer in the negative. The causes
which necessitate the appearance of the essence also appear sufficient to account for
the resulting action. Thus, on the one hand, it might at first seem that he would say the
essence is not necessary because the essence could be removed, and the action would
result in any case. On the other hand however, Santayana would probably also say that
the  question  is  misleading,  and  that  material  causes  so  strongly  necessitate  their
spiritual  effects  in  conscious  beings  that  we cannot  even hypothetically  conceive  a
scenario in which the material cause is present without its spiritual effect, and thus, in
which the spiritual effect is absent but the behavioral effect still results. Therefore, in
answer to such a question, Santayana could plausibly maintain that the appearance of
the essence is a necessary condition, in the sense that it must be present in order for the
action to result. Santayana even could hold this position without denying that material
causes are sufficient to determine action. More on this below. 
30 The  second two positions  are  stronger  and  have  in  common that  they  understand
intuited essences as in some sense the “objects” of action. By “object,” I  mean that
upon which action is performed, or that toward which action is directed (not the end or
final aim of action). Here, it should not be forgotten that, although Santayana always
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denies that ideas are active causes, he never avoids any language that implies that ideas
are the passive objects action.21 
31 One reason Santayana would have  for  holding a  version of  the  second position,  in
addition to the first, is his Aristotelianism, which could potentially commit him to the
view that intellection is not only necessary, but must necessarily take essence as its
object. Over and over again, Santayana points to Aristotle as the model for his own
thinking about spirit,22 because, for Aristotle, the activity of intellection involves the
actualization of an intellective faculty.23 This faculty takes what it receives from the
passive intellect and contemplates it in its intelligible form. The crucial point is that
this faculty must exercise itself on a particular object:  an object of intellection, which
becomes the occasion for its activity. (Note that none of this implies that the intelligible
object “exists” in any strong sense.) Yet Aristotle could describe the object as necessary
to the activity insofar as the activity must have an object, if it is to be performed at all.24
Indeed, Santayana says something to this effect:
In discerning any of these objects, whether they be essences or things, animal life
becomes intuition, the synthesis of attention by which an essence appears; but this
intellectual  act  is  wholly focused on its  object  and unified only there.  Taken as
tension or potential perception, sensibility is diffused through indefinite time and
through many vital functions; it would never exist actually and become sensation
unless it became the sensation of something;  the intuition of some essence, like a
pain or a sound. (Santayana 1942: 41; italics mine)
32 Notice how Santayana stresses that the potential for sensation remains potential, and
would not be actualized unless it became the perception “of something, the intuition of
some essence.” This does not contradict Santayana’s previous claim that an idea is not a
cause, because Aristotle would in no way describe the object of intellection as the cause 
of  the  intellective  activity,  efficient  or  otherwise.  In  fact,  like  Santayana,  Aristotle
explicitly denies this.25 Hence it is possible to assert that the essence is necessary for,
without asserting that it is the cause of intellection. 
33 Like the second position, the third asserts that essence is necessary as object, but this
time, for the action of material causes. Santayana appears to approach this position
whenever he suggests that an essence must be posited by a material impulse, where the
material impulse is presented as the active agent and the essence the passive object of
its activity. Here, the intuited essence is necessary because it is that without which
impulses  would  have  nothing  to  posit,  and  it  produces  behavior  in  being  posited.
Apparently  combining  this  point  with  the  previous  point,  Santayana  writes  in
Scepticism  and  Animal  Faith that  essences  make  practical  knowledge  possible  by
providing  it  its  object,  without  which,  thought  would  be  no  more  than  “a  bit  of
sentience without an object” (1955: 81). 
34 This  way  of  describing  essences  as  the  objects  of  material  impulse  can  be  found
throughout Santayana’ corpus. This language is already present in Scepticism and Animal
Faith, when he speaks of essences as being posited by the animal (ibid.: 107), and also of
essences as “used” by animal impulse for its own ends (ibid.: 179).
35 However,  I  would argue that it  is  particularly evident in Santayana’s description of
essences as signs. For instance, in an important essay intended to clarify his position on
mental causation, “The Efficacy of Thought,” Santayana continues to draw on the idea,
already developed in Scepticism and Animal Faith. Here, just as in Scepticism and Animal
Faith,  he  invokes  an  analogy  between  essences  and  sights  and  sounds,  which  “are
signals to the animal of his dangers or chances” (ibid.:  102). Conscious reflection, he
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explains,  does effect  behavior,  but  in  a  manner  analogous  to  the  way  the  sight  of
something can “effect” an animal’s behavior:  imagine bird who takes the sight of a
hawk’s shadow as a sign of danger. This occurs only because the sight is taken as a sign
of  danger  by bodily  habits  and  impulses,  “without  which  the  image  would  have
signified no danger.”26 Note the similarity of this claim to the claim in Scepticism and
Animal  Faith that  interpretation  must  be  “added  by my animal  impulse”  (1967:  110;
italics mine).
36 There are several points to be noted here. First, Santayana seems specifically concerned
with refuting the possible  objection that,  as  Kerr-Lawson states  it,  the functions of
reason are always performed by unconscious forces,  “and can function without our
awareness” (Kerr-Lawson 1986: 423). Santayana is pointing out that the animal could
not react appropriately to signs unless it were conscious of them. Second, the sign does
not interpret itself, or cause the impulses to interpret it in a certain way; it has to be
“interpreted” by the animal impulses.27 Third, the sign would play no role whatsoever,
were it not for the impulses, “without which the image would [not] have signified.”28 In
other words, the sign is by itself inert and insufficient to produce the behavioral effect:
it is an insufficient cause.29 
37 In  sum, when Santayana insists  that  essences  are  “impotent” or  “inefficacious,”  he
plausibly means that they are not active causes, motor causes, or sufficient causes of
action. This does not exclude the possibility that Santayana might have called essences
necessary conditions, or indeed, that he might have been willing to venture so far as to
call  the  intuited  essence  a  “cause,”  albeit  an  insufficient  one.  The  important  point
however,  is  that  in  denying  essence  these  roles,  he  does  not  deny  that  essences  are
necessary conditions for action.
38 Let me now suggest that the role of  essence in Santayana’s philosophy can be best
explained by an analogy: Imagine you see a sign for a restaurant and walk towards it.
Now, in everyday language it would be common to say the sign “causes” you to walk.
But is the sign a cause of your walking? Yes and no. Technically, the sign is not the a
cause of your walking because you are the active causal agent, and all the action has
been performed by you upon the sign, while the sign itself  has not done nothing. It
appears to have exerted no causal power at all. And yet we would not therefore deny
that the sign is necessary in some sense, because the sign provided an occasion for the
true causes of your action, and provided the object upon which those causes did their
work. Strictly speaking though, you walked because your eyes caught sight of the sign,
and then, your stomach, being hungry and looking for food, led you to focus on the
sign, to read it, and to take it in particular way, i.e. to take it as a sign of something that
could satisfy hunger. 
39 To add to this thought experiment, imagine the sign is a mirage produced by heat and
hunger,  and which exists  no more than essence.  Now,  we have even less reason to
assign it the status of a cause. Yet arguably, the mirage, as such, is just as necessary for
what follows, in the sense that there still has to be something there to be seen in the
swirling mists – something to be interpreted as a sign of food. Indeed even though the
sign doesn’t strictly “exist,” the agent still has to see something, in order to posit that it
exists. 
40 In other words, in declaring essences “impotent” or “inefficacious,” Santayana means
many things: they are not substances, active causes, motor causes, or sufficient causes.
But he has not completely ruled out the possibility that they are in some general sense
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necessary conditions for action. Moreover, the last two positions have in common that
they strongly imply that we cannot explain why action is channeled in one direction
rather than another without citing the fact that certain essences rather than others
appear to intuition. Nonetheless, some interpreters might still sooner reject the claim
that essences are necessary conditions than attempt to argue for the compatibility of
this claim with the claim that essences are causally inert. In what follows however, I
will show that Santayana is not alone in considering these assertions compatible, and
therefore his position should be classed among those of contemporary philosophers
who also assert their compatibility. 
 
5. Modern Epiphenomenalist or Not? 
41 The peculiarity  of  Santayana’s  position is  that  he  seems to  embrace  two positions,
apparently without awareness of the contradiction between them: He seemingly begins
by committing himself to the view that material causes are sufficient, first, to account
for the appearance of an essence, and second, to account for any action that results
from the positing of said essence. However, Santayana then surprises us by seemingly
continuing to argue that such an account of action would be incomplete unless it also
mentioned essences. This commits him to the odd – and apparently contradictory –
view that, although the material causes should in theory be sufficient to account for the
behavioral effect, we could not remove essences from our causal account and still have
an adequate account. 
42 Many contemporary  philosophers  would  say  that  these  two  positions  are  mutually
contradictory:  either we  assert  that  intuitions  are  reducible  to  their  material
constituents  and that  material  causes  are  sufficient  to  explain  human behavior  (in
which case intuitions as such play no important causal role), or intuitions do have a
causal role in human action (in which case the material causes are not sufficient to
explain action). In other words, Santayana’s position might be construed as stating that
material causes both are and are not sufficient causes. 
43 Indeed,  Santayana  could  seemingly  be  accused  of  violating  the  Causal  Exclusion
Principle. According to this principle, if an effect E has a sufficient cause C, then no
other property C* distinct  from C can be a  cause of  E.30 As  the principle  applies  to
mental causation, it appears to mean that a behavioral event cannot have a sufficient
material cause as well as an additional mental cause. For if C is causally sufficient for E,
then when C is present the effect E must follow, whether or not C* is present. It will
then be  argued that  behavior  cannot  have sufficient  physical  causes  and a  distinct
mental cause. The physical causes exclude the mental cause of the same effect.
44 However, in recent years both the Principle of Causal Exclusion, and the way it has
been applied to challenge views like Santayana’s, have come under criticism from many
philosophers of mind.31 Some have rejected the principle outright, while others have
argued that views that appear to violate this principle, and lead to overdetermination,
do not in fact do so.32 Some have pointed out that the principle rules out two sufficient
causes, but not a sufficient and insufficient cause. The same logic would state that it
does not rule out a sufficient cause and a necessary condition. Santayana’s view could
therefore fit comfortably under this heading. And this would put him in league with
many like-minded non-reductive physicalists. 
Santayana’s Epiphenomenalism Reconsidered
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-2 | 2020
11
45 Indeed,  Santayana’s  position  appears  to  resemble  many  supervienience  models
championed by compatibilists of this stripe, in which the material cause is sufficient
but the mental cause also necessary. This kind of model is often depicted with the help
of the following diagram: 
46 Here, p is a physical cause and m a mental cause, while p* is a physical effect, and m* a
mental  effect.  Vertical  arrows  represent  a  relation  of  supervenience.  The  others
represent a causal relation. The physical event p is a cause of the physical effect p* 
because p necessitates m, and m causes p*. Indeed, p is a sufficient cause of the effect, but
only because it is sufficient to cause the mental effect, which then, in combination with
the original material cause, is able to produce the physical result. Santayana could then
be interpreted as stating that a material state of affairs p first determines the intuition
of  an essence  m,  and then,  the  same material  state  of  affairs  produces  an impulse
which, in combination with the intuition of essence m, produces a physical result p*. 
47 Notice that the advantage of this model is that it denies that mental ideas are causes in
any real  sense,  since  any causal  power  they  might  be  assigned must  ultimately  be
traced to their underlying material conditions. The view that mental ideas cannot be
causes in the normal sense because they inherit all their power from their causes is
strikingly similar to Santayana’s claim that theirs is a “borrowed power”33 and that
“their effects are the effects of [their] causes.”34 In this model, m has an ambiguous
status. Many physical determinists would argue that if p is in fact a sufficient cause,
then m is not necessary, and can have no causal role.35 However, many compatibilists
would argue that, although m inherits the efficacy of it material basis, on which it both
supervenes  and  remains  closely  dependent,  mental  effects,  as  well  as  physical,  are
necessary.36 Indeed,  both  physical  causes  and  their  dependent  mental  causes  must
converge on their effects.37 
48 This analysis shows that if Santayana ever, at some time in his career, adopted a strong
version  of  epiphenomenalism,  he  need  not  have  done  so.  Santayana’s  view,  in  its
clearest formulation,  therefore plausibly seems to resemble,  not epiphenomenalism,
but  a  form  of  compatibilism  –  one  asserting  that,  a  material  state  gives  rise  to  a
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6. Conclusions
49 Taking a longer view of Santayana’s philosophical development has thus allowed us to
advance a new interpretation of his so-called epiphenomenalism. We can now see that
the designation “epiphenomenalism” is accurate insofar as Santayana’s train of logic
compels him to argue that mental phenomena has its origin in the material realm and
“it is tethered to its starting place except by its intent in leaping” (1955: 165). In this
sense, he deprives ideas of causal agency: ideas are not causal agents in the sense that
they  cannot  be  the  causes  of  their  own  appearance  nor  the  causes  of  their  own
hypostatization. Yet as Santayana repeatedly stresses, ideas are in some sense acted
upon by forces with causal agency when they are posit-ed, and to this extent, they can
play  a  role  in  determining  behavior.  This  leads  us  to  tentatively  suggest,  in
contradistinction  to  many  commentators,  that  Santayana’s  so-called
epiphenomenalism were perhaps better classified as a form of compatibilism, alongside
some modern forms of compatibilism it resembles.
 
Postscript
Intimations of Santayana’s Mature View in Egotism in German
Philosophy
50 Perhaps one of the reasons that Santayana is not more specific about his position is
that he has already sketched out the outlines in his early works. In closing therefore, it
will be useful to turn to the final pages of Santayana’s Egoism in German Philosophy. For it
is  arguably here that  he first  articulates  the ideas  that  will  become central  for  his
philosophy of mind, and if we look closely, we can see that his views remain largely
unchanged through his mature work. Indeed, I  shall  argue that the interpretation I
have just provided is anticipated by this early work. 
51 Here,  Santayana  observes  that,  before  they  can  take  ideals  as  objects  of  practical
pursuit, German Idealists must assume that their ideals exist qua objects of desire and
pursuit. To this end, they have to assume that ideals can be instantiated in the world –
in  a  word,  that  they  can  exist.  Further,  they  must  believe  that,  if  their  ideal  were
instantiated  in  the  world,  then  this  would  correspond  to  a  moral  good  worthy  of
pursuit, i.e. one that would satisfy a desire. But this, according to Santayana, is usually
an erroneous assumption. (Later, Santayana will explain that this is because essence is
not existence.)
52 What Idealists do next tells us not just about them, but about the human condition
more generally.  According to  Santayana,  Idealists  eventually  learn that  no possible
justification can be given for treating ideals as existing. Thankfully, Idealism correctly
discerns that the only reason that the subject posits any ideal’s existence is the Will:
“All reasons, all justifications must be posterior to my will; my will itself can have no
justification and no reason.”  (1915:  167).  Here  Santayana sees  Protestant  faith  as  a
precursor to the Will, and its role in German thought (ibid.: 22). It is this Protestant
faith, or Will, which Santayana already refers to as “the vital self-trust or faith of the
animal will” that will become animal faith in Scepticism and Animal Faith (ibid.: 31). 
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53 The  phrase  “animal  faith”  is  most  memorably  used  in  the  context  of  an  elaborate
metaphor that closes the book, in which the idealist is compared to a bull, and one of
his ideals to a red flag waved by a matador. The bull charges the red cloth, heedless of
the fact that it is an illusory and “with no suspicion that a hidden agency is mocking
him.” Moreover, the bull is unaware that he is pressed forward by forces outside his
own control,  by “his own strength, rage, and courage” (ibid.:  149). The metaphor is
designed to show that the “will is the expression of some animal body.”38
54 In other words, the metaphor is designed to illustrate that, just as the bull chases the
red flag in the mistaken belief that it is a real object with material value, so the Idealist
chases ideals in the mistaken belief that they are real objects with real worth. But what
causes the chase? The bull’s own animal reflexes are responsible for this reaction. In a
similar way, the idealist chases his ideals because his material impulses are so effected
as to (a.) direct him toward certain ideals; (b.) believe in them and posit their existence;
and (c.) pursue them as if they were adequate substitutes for material goods in the real
world. This is what Idealists do not understand. 
55 Further, the analogy illustrates a point that Santayana will make over the course of his
career, namely that Idealist philosophers mistakenly take ideas to be causes of action
(1942:  151).  Idealist  philosophers  seem  to  assume  that,  when  the  will  posits  the
existence of an idea, it is because there is something about the idea itself that demands
that it be posited. In this way they seem to speak as if the idea were the cause: the idea,
they think, causes the will to posit it. Contrary to this, Santayana argues that, in reality,
it is the will that takes an idea and posits its existence. This can be seen in the analogy
in the fact that the bull believes the flag has provoked it. In fact, it is the other way
around. It would be more accurate to say the bull’s raging impulses are responsible for
the way it has focused its attention on the flag, and has taken it, rightly or wrongly, as
the object on which it will unleash its rage.
56 It must be admitted, of course, that to the person pursuing an ideal it sincerely feels as
if the ideal itself had power over the subject, and was calling forth this action from the
agent – and the agent also has faith that this is the case. Animal faith then turns out to
be not just the will’s faith in the reality of the ideas that it pursues, but also its faith
that these ideas are themselves the origin of the pursuing activity, the cause which sets
it in motion (i.e. that these ideas are not just the objects but the efficient cause of the
pursuing activity). In reality, the person is urged on by the kind of faith the will has “in
its ends because it is pursuing them” – a kind of “animal faith” (1915: 149). 
57 I would argue that we can find here, in this early work, all the ideas which I have just
attributed to Santayana. First, animal faith arises from material impulses and posits the
existence of ideas. Second, ideas are not illusory in the sense of being complete non-
entities, but in the sense of appearing to have more substantial existence and causal
efficacy than they in fact do (when Santayana uses the analogy, it is not in order to
stress that the red flag is an “illusion” in the sense of a complete non-entity, or that it
does not exist even qua object of the bull’s action. Rather, the red flag is an “illusion” in
the sense that it presents itself to the bull as more substantial and efficacious than it in
fact  is).  Third,  we  can see  that  Santayana’s  point  is  to  stress  that  ideas  cannot  be
identified  with  the  material  or  efficient  causes  of  action.  Fourth,  Santayana  is
concerned to stress that it is the will that is active, whereas the ideal is the passive object
of  the  will’s  action.  However,  it  must  also  be  noted  that  none  of  these  claims  are
incompatible with describing ideals as the objects upon which human behavior acts, nor
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does Santayana avoid doing so. I would argue that this pattern continues throughout
his later work, and that what he denies is that ideas are material or efficient causes, but
that he never rules out that intuitions of essence serve as objects of belief and action. 
58 Egoism in German Philosophy, I would therefore argue, already contains the essence of
Santayana’s  mature  philosophy  of  mind.  In  Scepticism  and  Animal  Faith,  Santayana
merely reiterates what he had previously stated in Egoism in German Philosophy – only
that  now Santayana  speaks  not  of  ideals  but  of  intuited  essences.  Here,  Santayana
revises his view only in order to state that it is not just German philosophers, but all
human  beings  who  have  animal  faith.  In  other  words,  he  simply  universalizes  his
previous  claim,  as  he  now realizes  the  prevalence  of  the  phenomenon that  afflicts
German  thinkers  so  that,  far  from  being  bereft  of  truth,  German  philosophy  “is  a
genuine expression of the pathetic situation in which any animal finds itself upon the
earth, and any intelligence in the universe” (Santayana 1915: 7).
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NOTES
1. Taking the latter view, Lachs proposes that Santayana’s epiphenomenalism be viewed as a
product  of  its  overall  compatibility  with his  philosophy,  ie.  his  dualism,  his  belief  in  mind’s
dependence on physical causes, and his apparent preference for a material realm “exempt from
interference by non-physical agencies” (Lachs 1967: 273).
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2. According  to  Matthew  Flamm,  Santayana’s epiphenomenalism  is  non-standard  in  that  it
tolerates  indeterminacy  at  the  level  of  material  causes  (Flamm  2014:  26),  and  allows  for
something like free will at the level of the psyche (ibid.: 27). 
3. See especially Wahman (2015: 99-105).
4. Santayana, “The Realm of Spirit,” (1942: 565). “Even its rebellions and contrary dreams are
dictated by its animal predicaments.” (Ibid.: 597). See also Santayana (1955: 68).
5. Brodrick argues that Santayana was on the verge of articulating the contemporary theory that
a single event has two strata, a material one and a spiritual one (Brodrick 2013: 243). However,
the advantage of this view championing so-called “total natural events” is not clear as it seems to
fall back into a view that closely resembling epiphenomenalism. For Brodrick would presumably
still maintain that events cause in virtue of their physical, not their mental properties. 
6. Some have argued, for example, that he has defined spirit in such a way as to rule out the
possibility  of  causal  interaction  between  it  and  psyche.  According  to  Angus  Kerr-Lawson,
Santayana’s  epiphenomenalism follows  logically  from the  manner  in  which he  defines  spirit
(Kerr-Lawson 1986: 422; cf.  420).  Brodrick claims, by contrast,  that the key to the mind-body
problem is to be found in Santayana’s concept of the psyche (Brodrick 2013: 239, 247-8). See also
Lachs (1967: 257; cf. 268). 
7. Lachs sometimes relies on the claim that, since only matter is defined as cause, mind must
have its cause in matter (Lachs 1967: 263). 
8. In The Sense of Beauty Santayana states that the recurring and stable qualities that we associate
with an object constitute our idea of it (Santayana 1955b: §29, §38). However, he already argues
here that so-called “secondary qualities” can make such a lasting impression and present such a
“clear and steady” picture to the mind (ibid.:  §46), that they sometimes seem to us to inhere
within the object itself and to constitute its “essential qualities.” The result is a special class of
ideas called “aesthetic ideals” (ibid.: §11, §46). Here, we see an early intimation of Santayana’s
mature view that essence comprises both stable and subjective properties.
9. Santayana’s argument seems to be that, since essences are formed by abstracting away from
the material substrate in which they subsist and which is potentially continuous among different
objects, and since it is presumably due to precisely such a material substrate that objects “assume
relations external to their respective essences,” we cannot retrospectively infer anything from
an essence  about  its  causal  relation  to  other  essences:  “for  the  internal  or  logical  relations
between  these  essences  will  never  establish  any  succession  or  continuity  between  them.”
(Santayana 1942: 208). Thus, fire is in some way intrinsic to smoke’s essence, but this is not to
establish the underlying causal link between smoke and fire. Here, the way an essence contains
reference  to  other  essences  is  complicated.  For  instance,  Santayana  distinguishes  between a
“pure” essence whose elements are mutually “implied,” and the essence of an existing thing,
which unites irrelevant essences, and whose elements are merely “conjoined” (Santayana 1967:
165).
10. The connection between the realm of existence and practical action is made most explicit in
“Note on Morality versus Spirit” (Santayana 1967: 300-1).
11. In arguing for the centrality of the distinction between essence and existence to Santayana’s
philosophy I am preceded by Donald Williams (1967). 
12. Most scholars move directly from the premise that essences do not exist to the conclusion
that they therefore have no causal power. In Lachs’ rendition, essences do not exist “because
neither special nor temporal properties may be predicated of them.” Hence, because they do not
exist, they do exist “in a space-time network with the consequent possibility of causal action”
(Lachs 1967: 255). A Similar argument is repeated in Brodrick (2013: 239-40). 
13. Here, I do not wish to deny that Santayana makes many epiphenomenalist statements in his
early work, in particular, The Life of Reason (2011). However, as I explain below, the few arguments
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he provides for these views are relatively conjectural and cursory as compared with the more
definitive argument he provides in his mature work, Scepticism and Animal Faith (1955). 
14. Here,  Santayana is  consistent in maintaining throughout his late work that belief  always
takes  an  object,  and  that  the  object  is  necessarily  an  essence:  “its  terms  are  invariably the
essences present to intuition.” (Santayana 1942: 198).
15. For example, John Lachs (2009) claims there is no connection between the doctrine of animal
faith and Santayana’s ontology. Similarly, Dilworth identifies a tension between his doctrine of
animal faith and his skeptical Platonism (Dilworth 2014: 71).
16. Santayana (1955: 173).
17. A consequence of this is that, when we posit that an essence exists, we place it in a set of
causal relations, which are extrinsic to it (ibid.: 48).
18. See further the below postscript.
19. Santayana (2011: 223-4; 1955: 85; 1942: 624).
20. Santayana, General Review, (1942: 834).
21. It should be noted of course that the term “object” is ambiguous, and that this ambiguity
sometimes leads Santayana to deny that intuitions are the objects of perception and action. At
one point, Santayana says of intuitions, “none can become an object of pursuit or perception.”
However, in this case, he means that intuitions are not the ultimate objects of desire, since as he
goes on to explain, only particular things are “the existing things or events to which the animal
is reacting and to which he is attributing the essences which arise” (Santayana 1955: 93). 
22. Santayana (2011: 223-4; 1942: 600, 749, 816-7).
23. Santayana (1942:749).
24. For Aristotle, an intelligible structure, or form, must exist qua capable of being received by
the passive intellect and qua capable of being contemplated by the active intellect. De Anima III.5
430a10-25.  Compare Santayana’s claim that,  “as Aristotle says,  the mind can only absorb the
forms of things. It is for the body to deal with their matter.” Santayana, “Apologia Pro Mente
Sua,” (1951: 542).
25. This is because Aristotle explicitly states that the active intellect is unaffected (De Anima III.5,
430a23).
26. Santayana, “The Efficacy of Thought,” (1967: 249).
27. Santayana (1955: 63). In this vein, Santayana writes: “In order to reach existences, intent
must transcend intuition and take data for what they mean, not for what they are; it must credit
them, as understanding credits word.” (Ibid.: 65).
28. Santayana, “The Efficacy of Thought” (1967: 249).
29. The above suggests that Santayana’s solution to the problem of mental causation could be
related  to  the  contemporary  observation  that  behavioural  effects  can  have  one  sufficient
physical cause and a distinct but insufficient mental cause. It has been pointed out that this type
of scenario would not violate the causal exclusion principle, which I address further below, and
which, in its most common form, states that behavioral events cannot have two sufficient causes
(Kim 2005: 17). See further, Arnadottir & Crane (2013).
30. Kim (2001: 276). Kim gives various other formulations of the principle, for example that no
event can be given more than one complete and independent causal explanation (Kim 1998: 45). 
31. Block (2003). 
32. Kallestrup argues that we can reject the Exclusion Principle and accept overdetermination
(Kallestrup 2006: 471, 478).
33. Santayana “Maxims” (1967: 166).
34. Santayana (1942: 635). 
35. Moreover, if m* is fully determined by p*, m is excluded as a cause of m* (Kim 2005: 39ff.).
36. Kallestrup (2006: 472), Arnadottir & Crane (2013: 255), Bennett (2003: 488-9). 
37. Loewer (2002: 658). 
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38. It shows, as Santayana says, that German philosophers have underestimated the extent to
which  “the  environment  in  which  the  will  finds  itself  controls  and  rewards  its  various
movements.” Santayana defines animal faith, his version of the will, as “a wager or demand made
beyond all evidence, and in contempt of all evidence, in obedience to an innate impulse” (ibid.:
167, cf. 28, 103). 
ABSTRACTS
The present essay argues against the view that Santayana’s philosophy can unproblematically be
classified  as  epiphenomenalist.  To  this  end,  it  examines  the  central  tenets  that  provide  the
foundation for his position on metal causation as developed in Scepticism and Animal Faith. This
analysis shows that a range of positions are available to Santayana that are compatible with his
prohibition on invoking ideas as motor causes, perhaps even demanded by it. While Santayana is
consistent in denying that ideas are causes, taken in the usual sense of efficient or motor causes,
he does not clearly deny that they are necessary conditions for some behavioral effects.  The
essay then responds to the objection that we should sooner reject the claim that essences are
necessary conditions for action than attempt to argue for the compatibility of this claim with the
claim that essences are causally inert. It is argued that Santayana is not alone in considering
these  assertions  compatible,  and therefore  his  position  should  be  classed  alongside  those  of
contemporary philosophers who also assert their compatibility. The essay closes by examining
some similarities between Santayana’s view and those of contemporary compatibilists. 
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